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Part One – Reform, Chaos or 
Religious Dictatorship?  
1.1 Introduction 
The political struggle in Iran is not for and against the Islamic Revolution of 
1979 per se, but over its future direction. A clerical faction led by the popu-
larly elected President Seyyid Mohammed Khatami wishes to abandon 
Ruhollah Khomeini’s theocracy and create a new synthesis of Islam and 
democracy, while the post-revolutionary generation wants jobs and greater 
freedom. Perhaps paradoxically, the last decades have seen an explosion in 
female education. At present these youngsters see Khatami’s reformism as 
their best hope, but if frustrated – by the strength of both the ideologues and 
those with an economic stake in the dictatorship – may turn against him too. 
His rival, Ali Khamenei, Khomeini’s successor as Supreme Leader, lacks 
both spiritual qualifications and revolutionary legitimacy. We will only dis-
cover how much actual control he has over the Army and the religious mili-
tias if and when the conflict becomes violent, which means that Khatami will 
have failed.  
Iran is a large and complex country, and we are reluctantly obliged to in-
dulge in simplifications such as ‘the conservatives’ versus the ‘reformers’, 
and ‘the clergy’ – even though many of the reformers are ayatollahs them-
selves. Even Khomeini was not quite as universally venerated as his adher-
ents pretend. This article is based on fieldwork in Iran in April 2000, in 
which opposition politicians, presidential advisers and other intellectuals 
were interviewed, combined with newspapers and recent secondary material.  
1.2 The Hijacking of the Revolution  
The Iranian Constitution dates back to 1906, when imperial absolutism was 
ended and parliamentary government instituted by a combination of foreign 
pressure, domestic radicals and the mullahs. It is true that Parliament was 
rarely independent of the Shah, and that many of the modernising reforms 
were never completed, but the constitutional revolution nevertheless had a 
great intellectual and psychological effect; an urban elite was politically 
mobilised, national feeling flourished, new newspapers and parties appeared. 
However, rapid modernisation and secularisation were imposed from the top 
down, just as it had been in Turkey. Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925–41), an 
admirer of Atatürk, replaced kinship with citizenship and religion with natio-
nalism. In 1924 there were 5,984 theology students, in 1940 only 784; but in 
1925 there were 74,000 secular schools, in 1940 355,000. In the 1930s mar-
riage was transferred to civil courts, the clergy lost control over religious 
foundations, religious celebrations were restricted and the veil was banned. 
His successor Muhammad Reza Shah (1941–79) introduced female suffrage. 
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The Iranian clergy were more powerful than the Turkish, but nevertheless 
stayed well out of politics. During the Mossadeq interlude of 1951, which 
represented a more radical phase of liberal nationalism, some middle-rank 
clerics supported him, while the leaders backed the Shah or remained neu-
tral. It should be emphasised that while the rarified theological theory of the 
Shi’a recognises no secular authorities, the actual Iranian tradition was for an 
apolitical clergy. This did not begin to change until 1963, when a fraction of 
the clergy, led by Khomeini, reacted to a savage repression of a student re-
volt by going into opposition.  
This development coincided with growing scepticism about enforced 
secularisation. ‘Atheistic nationalism’ began to lose ground, and was re-
placed by a debate about religious modernism. Islam began to mobilise the 
grass roots as the modern-state project never had. It is, of course, an over-
simplification to regard the overthrow of the Shah as solely or even primar-
ily a religious movement. Rather, the Shah succeeded in alienating a great 
number of different groupings simultaneously. Although revolutions often 
take off in directions not foreseen by those who hope and agitate for them, it 
was by no means obvious at the time, or a foregone conclusion, that the Iran-
ian one would end up as a theocracy. That it did so may be ascribed as much 
to the political cunning of Ruhollah Khomeini as much as to any universal 
popular desire to be ruled by ayatollahs. Islam was useful as a weapon 
against the ‘decadent West’, but the negative consensus about getting rid of 
the Shah and his American puppet masters was not matched by a positive 
consensus about what should replace him. This provided an opportunity for a 
charismatic and uncompromising leader who knew exactly what he wanted 
and how to get it.  
The subsequent dominance of Khomeini’s theocracy makes it easy to for-
get that the first post-revolutionary government was secular. Prime Minister 
Bazargan, however, lost the struggle with Khomeini’s Revolutionary Coun-
cil, not least because a more or less spontaneous student occupation of the 
American Embassy in November 1979 was converted by Khomeini into a 
running sore of international politics lasting an astounding 444 days. The 
country’s first president, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, a moderate Islamist, was 
forced into exile in 1981, while his successor and many other leading politi-
cians were murdered in the same year. Although Khomeini did not start the 
war with Iraq, he made it serve his purposes. Many of those who had helped 
overthrow the Shah, not only communists but also the clergy, felt that 
Khomeini had ‘hijacked’ their revolution.  
In 1979 the secular Bazargan government proposed an amendment 
sharply restricting the (little practised) clause of the 1906 Constitution giving 
the clergy the right to vet legislation. Instead, a committee mostly composed 
of religious leaders turned it on its head and incorporated the principle of 
velayat-e faqih, ‘the rule of the learned’, or theocracy. This doctrine is based 
on a characteristic doctrine of Twelver Shi’i Islam, that the last Imam did not 
die but went into ‘occultation’. Like the Messiah for a Jew, Christ for a 
Christian and the Mahdi for some Sunni Muslims, one day the Hidden Imam 
will return to inaugurate the perfect society. In the meantime, his throne 
must be kept warm by the ‘doctors of the law’. Khomeini converted this 
essentially mystical doctrine into actual political authority, whereby the 
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legislative, executive and judicial powers were vested in the experts in 
shari’a – of whom he was naturally the foremost. This conversion is based 
on some fancy exegetical footwork and is regarded by many Muslim theo-
logians of equal weight as rank heresy.  
The pre-revolutionary constitutional framework was not abolished, but 
neutralised by a parallel religious system. Khomeini’s power was supported 
by populist manipulation of the grass roots, and by some new institutions, 
for example the Pasdaran (the Revolutionary Guard) and the Bassij religious 
police. As the disintegration of the original revolutionary enthusiasm led to 
factionalism, the Pasdaran and Bassij were increasingly regulated and 
bureaucratised, naturally giving their personnel a stake in the system.  
1.3 The Succession 
The retirement of Khomenei in 1989 ended the revolution’s ‘charismatic’ 
phase and allowed previously suppressed disagreements to emerge, as they 
always do. People begin to lose interest in the big words and the sweep of 
symbolism and ask how the metaphysical grandeur of the revolutionary vis-
ion relates to the price of fish. Under Ali Khamenei as Supreme Leader 
(1989–present) and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as President (1989–97), 
the revolution entered a more pragmatic era. Fears that Iran would break up 
proved unfounded, and from that point of view the Rafsanjani period was a 
success. However, Rafsanjani’s economic policies, aimed at the fostering of 
a democratic middle class, were emasculated by the alliance of the clergy 
and the bazaaris. Among other things, Iranian theocracy has meant the con-
trol of large sectors of the economy by religious foundations.  
As long as Khomenei was alive, there was no doubt who was the supreme 
political and religious leader, but his designation of Khamenei (President 
1981–89) as his successor in the post of Supreme Leader ultimately damaged 
his own legacy. Khamenei did not meet the criteria for velayat-e faqih, he 
was not by any stretch of the imagination the most learned in Islamic law. 
Before his designation he did not even hold the title of ayatollah, but only 
hojjateslam, one grade lower; he was more of a politician than a scholar. 
Khomeini therefore decided that the theocratic principle would have to take 
a back seat to effective government based on the interests of the community. 
In 1989 a constitutional amendment retroactively justified the choice of suc-
cessor by toning down the religious requirements for the Supreme Leader at 
the expense of his political qualifications.  
This may have been a tactical mistake. However controversial Khomeini 
himself may have been, he legitimised his position primarily through his 
expertise in Islamic law, and his leading role in the Revolution. He left 
Khamenei, who was not even a proper ayatollah, as a supreme leader, with 
the last word in all disputed religious and political questions, demanding full 
obedience to theocratic laws but without sufficient religious authority to 
interpret them. This over-promotion of a mere hojjateslam sabotaged the 
legitimacy of the entire Revolution. Khamenei’s theological inadequacy cre-
ated potential for a split between the political and religious leaderships. 
Other senior clerics naturally enough felt that this was a misuse of religion 
for political ends, and feared that the end result would be an erosion of their 
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own prestige. The government would so to speak squander its religious capi-
tal, which could not so lightly be built up again. This growing scepticism of 
the theocracy among the real religious leaders means that defence of 
Khomeini’s model is increasingly left to the opportunists who have used it to 
acquire power and economic privileges, or hope to do so.  
The extent of Khamenei’s failure to fill the Imam’s shoes was seen cle-
arly in the presidential election of 1997, when the people voted for Khatami 
and not for the candidate implicitly endorsed by the Supreme Leader. The 
same thing happened in the subsequent parliamentary elections of 2000. This 
expression of the popular will was more than a declaration of no confidence 
in Ali Khamenei as an individual, it was a direct challenge to the entire theo-
cratic system. 
1.4  The Conservative Counter-offensive: Events of April 2000 
April 2000 turned out to be a particularly dramatic month, in which the con-
servative forces struck back in order to neutralise the overwhelming victory 
of the reformists in the parliamentary elections the previous February. In this 
attempt to redress the balance the conservatives made full use of all the lev-
ers of power available. A detailed review of these events will help to reveal 
the rules of the Iranian political game.  
General, 1–30 April 
The conservative Council of Guardians invalidates the first-round returns 
from 11 electoral districts, provoking riots in the cities of Khalkhal and 
Sarvestan. The Council of Guardians also challenges the election result in 
Teheran, where pro-Khatami candidates won 29 of 30 seats.  
The sitting, conservative Majlis passes controversial laws to secure its 
own power and neutralise the new and reformist parliament. One bill tries to 
stop Parliament touching Khamenei-controlled organisations related to natio-
nal security. (However, when opening the new parliament at the end of May, 
Khatami makes it clear that the directive will not be followed and that the 
Majlis can consider anything it wants.)  
Blaming the free press for their defeat and citing a prohibition on criticis-
ing the Constitution, the conservatives enact a stricter media law, allowing 
for closure of newspapers and imprisonment of editors and journalists. It was 
practiced immediately.  
Throughout the period Khatami tries to calm people down, particularly 
the students, the most likely to challenge the conservatives in the streets. The 
reformists think that provoking violence is the conservatives’ strategy.  
April also saw the trial for the attempted murder in March of Saeed 
Hajjarian, one of the leading lights of the reform newspaper Sobh-e Emruz.  
13 April 
The trial opens in Shiraz of 13 Jews accused of spying for Israel, widely 
interpreted as an attempt to destroy reform and block détente with the USA. 
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15 April 
The German Greens hold a conference in Berlin, inviting both reformists and 
anti-revolutionaries from the Iranian diaspora without thinking about the 
invitees’ backgrounds and personal security. It backfires, and is a gift to the 
conservatives, who broadcast edited versions. The footage of an Iranian 
woman dissident dancing is shown in Muharram, the period of mourning for 
the martyrdom of Hussein, and it was made to appear that the participants 
were supporting the ancien régime, Zionism and homosexuality. The Berlin 
conference poured fuel on the flames of paranoia about ‘infiltration’.  
16 April 
Conservative factions within Pasdaran make sinister comments on the air, 
hinting at violence by the ‘Hammer of the Revolution’. 
18 April 
The Bassij march in Teheran, chanting ‘Death to mercenary writers’. This is 
aimed primarily at the journalist Ganji, who has long been investigating the 
murders of major reformists in 1999, including the veteran Daroush Foruhar 
and his wife.  
20–23 April 
Khamenei makes several frontal attacks on the free press, accusing it of 
undermining Islamic principles, creating social conflict and having the same 
agenda as ‘the Great Satan’. He has never before spoken out so directly 
against the reformers. This strengthens the impression that the street demon-
strations and violence of the Bassij are orchestrated from the top. There are 
rumours of a coup d’état, but the generals of Pasdaran publish an open letter 
repudiating the idea.  
22 April 
Pasdaran’s accusations lead to the arrest of Ganji, who was also at the dis-
credited Berlin conference. He is ill, and not expected to survive long 
imprisonment.  
23 April 
13 dailies and weeklies are shut down by court order, supported by 
Khamenei, and another six later, allegedly on the basis of conspiracy theo-
ries related to American infiltration, but in fact because they had contributed 
to the ‘wrong’ election result. All the important mouthpieces for Khatami 
and the reformers are now silenced. It is made clear that closed papers will 
no longer be permitted to re-open under new names, as before.  
25 April 
The Teheran authorities announce that publications that have continuously 
printed untruths prejudicial to ‘the religious principles of the Islamic revolu-
tion’ will be stopped. The allegations of foreign conspiracy and infiltration 
are repeated. The liberal-minded Ministry of Culture is accused of responsi-
bility for the ‘crisis’. 
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1.5 The Conservative Counter-offensive: Mullahs on the 
March 
The conservatives are using all the instruments of power available to them. 
We shall look at some of these: 
1.5.1 The Council of Guardians’ attempt to overrule the elections 
The Council of Guardians supervises elections and vets candidates, rejecting 
those whose attitudes to Islam make them ‘unsuitable’. (However, Ayatollah 
Hossein Ali Montazeri, one of the architects of the Constitution, claims that 
this second function was unintended and that exclusion of candidates on 
ideological grounds threatens the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic.) The 
hardliners within the Council of Guardians wished to cancel the second 
round of elections altogether and prevent the new reformist parliament from 
meeting. Such a course would have completely derailed Khatami’s cautious 
democratisation, polarised the country and led to even more violence. 
Khamenei, however, who possesses much greater realism, intervened and 
insisted that the rules be followed.  
Former President Rafsanjani also played an interesting role, in coalition 
with the Council of Guardians and the Expediency Council (which can arbi-
trate between the Majlis and the Guardians); he attempted to profile himself 
as a bridge-builder and guarantor of stability, but in the light of the revelati-
ons in the free press about his role in the murder of leading reformers in 
1998, the progressives remained unimpressed. Of the 30 seats in Teheran, 29 
went to reformers, and Rafsanjani squeaked through in last place. Funnily 
enough, after the Guardians’ ‘recount’, he was now further up on the list, 
and one of the liberals was rejected. Students and others mobilised so effect-
tively against Rafsanjani that he was obliged to announce the resignation of 
his seat. Such a crushing humiliation illustrates the strength of Iran’s civil 
society. However, he remained chairman of the Expediency Council, which 
he then managed to split by attempting to use it to reduce the powers of 
Parliament. Meanwhile, insight into his techniques of self-enrichment has 
discredited him completely. He is no longer the moderate pragmatist whom 
the people hoped would modernise society, liberalise the economy, ease up 
on public morality and improve relations with the West.  
1.5.2 The courts  
An Islamic state is one where legislation is based on shari’a, the Muslim 
religious law. If Allah is the supreme lawgiver, then clearly there must be 
conformity between His Revelation and the laws of human society. Like rab-
binical and Christian canon law, shari’a was created by a long process of 
expert exegesis of Scripture; in the same way, it is not a neatly organised 
code but a mass of contradictory material that requires great expertise to dis-
entangle. However, most Muslim countries also had and have a secular pub-
lic law (kanon) as well, confining shari’a to religious and family issues. The 
Constitution of 1979 did not empower the Majlis to make laws by itself, for 
the Council of Guardians must scrutinise them for conformity with Islam. 
Moreover, the separation of the roles of investigator, prosecutor and judge 
that is a part of the rule of law as we understand it, has been abolished; an 
Islamic system, it is said, requires only one omnicompetent man of God.  
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If the ordinary courts and judges are bad enough, the jungle of special 
courts (the clerical courts, the military courts and the Islamic revolutionary 
courts) are worse. The revolutionary courts deal with all matters of national 
security, drugs, smuggling and subversion, which include not only working 
for a Pahlavi restoration but also ‘hindering the struggle of the Iranian 
people’; their regard for due process leaves much to be desired. Khamenei 
calls their activities ‘legal violence’, but outside observers would call them a 
violation of human rights. 
The courts have become conservative bastions over which not even 
Khamenei, who controls their appointment, sometimes has much influence. 
While some judges are the obedient servants of the Supreme Leader, others 
are riding their own political hobby-horses. Attempts are being made to 
apply a single regulatory system, without much success. The courts are 
opposed to all reformist demands: liberalisation of the educational system, 
greater artistic and cultural freedom, the attempt to overcome international 
enmities and the hope of emerging from the self-imposed isolation that was 
one of the Revolution’s trademarks. 
In April, the courts were so useful to the conservatives that we can speak 
of a jurisprudential coup d’état. No other source of support for the conserva-
tives is so reliable; even Pasdaran played a moderating role, the generals op-
posing military intervention. For example, when the 13 Jews of Shiraz ac-
cused of espionage appeared in court, they had already been 14 months in 
prison, and as in other dictatorships, were shown ‘confessing’ on TV. This 
essentially political case served as a barometer of the power struggle be-
tween the reformists and the conservatives, and was staged as a spoiling ope-
ration for the thaw Khatami wants in relations with the USA and the West.  
The attempted murder in March of presidential adviser Saeed Hajjarian 
was seen as a harbinger of things to come. Reformists regarded Hajjarian – 
who survived but was crippled – as a martyr, and Khatami not only condem-
ned the crime but ordered a full investigation. However, the reformists regar-
ded the trial of the gunman in April as a piece of theatre staged by the right-
wing ‘political mafia’, with a mere ‘fall guy’ in the dock; the principals 
were, of course, in the Pasdaran and the security services, operating with 
Khamenei’s blessing. On the other hand, the fact that this crime and the 
murders of reformists in 1999 were investigated and brought to trial at all is 
encouraging.  
1.5.3 The assault on the free press 
The hardest blow struck by the conservatives against the reformers has been 
the attack on freedom of speech. Attracting larger readerships with their re-
ports of violence and corruption, the newspapers were undermining the 
clergy’s political monopoly. As well as promoting critical debate, the press 
acted as a substitute for the political organisation that Khatami lacked. With-
out thinking of the effect on the country’s international reputation, the con-
servatives let their fury rain down on the heads of the liberal press, which 
was accused of offending religious feelings, promoting social unrest, show-
ing little or no respect for revolutionary principles, rumour-mongering, 
encouraging the young to immorality, being in collusion with the decadent 
West and thus representing a threat to everything the Revolution stands for 
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and has achieved. Press questioning of velayat-e faqih was especially pro-
vocative, for if this doctrine falls, it can take other Islamic principles with it. 
Khatami is blamed for being a passive spectator of all this irreligious back-
sliding. Above all, however, the aggressiveness was due to the conserva-
tives’ feeling of humiliation in the elections.  
Khamenei’s militant speech of 20 April in which he accused the free 
press of being lackeys of the imperialists (US, UK and Israel) was taken as a  
shot from a starting pistol for a coordinated offensive. Two days later 
Khamenei spoke at Teheran University, naming certain papers as a threat to 
national security and thus preparing the psychological ground for closures 
and arrests. Next day 12 major newspapers and journals were closed, another 
two on 27 April, and arrests were made. The outgoing Majlis contributed by 
transferring responsibility for the press from one of the most liberal 
institutions – the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance – to the police, 
the security services and the judiciary. The Minister of Culture, Atatollah 
Mohajerani, railed against this new press law as unconstitutional, but 
conceded that a law passed by Parliament and approved by the Guardians 
had to be respected. This was a typical reformist reaction. Khatami kept a 
low profile, confining himself to appeals for calm. Time has shown this to be 
a sound strategy, as the reformers cannot compete with the conservatives in 
the arena of violence, since the latter control the judiciary, the police and the 
security forces. The hope is that Khatami can get the new Majlis to repeal 
the reactionary press law.  
1.5.4 Pasdaran, Bassij and revolutionary justice 
In the attempt to stop the reformists, the conservative forces have not re-
frained from political murder. In 1998 there was a series of murders of re-
formers, which have subsequently been traced to the security services, and in 
March 2000 an attempt was made to assassinate presidential adviser 
Hajjarian. When the Bassij marched in Teheran, they turned their ire against 
Ganji, who had done more than anyone to track down the killers. Such mob 
rule has been actively encouraged by Khamenei, who is empowered to call 
out both Pasdaran and Bassij. He endeavours to keep their revolutionary 
zeal glowing, and tries to profile himself as the guarantor of the Revolution 
they serve. His TV channels are always showing his picture next to that of 
Khomenei, and he does his best to monopolise the religious festivals. For ex-
ample, April 2000 cannot be fully understood except in the context of 
Muharram, the month of mourning over the martyrdom of Hussein, the son 
of ‘Ali and grandson of the Prophet, at the battle of Kerbala.  
Many would claim that democratisation cannot succeed unless these 
institutions are dissolved. Pasdaran was created by Khomeini as a counter-
weight to the Army, which he did not trust. Although it is structured as a 
military organisation and fought in the war against Iraq, its primary task – as 
its English name, Revolutionary Guard, suggests – is in domestic politics. It 
is recruited from religiously motivated soldiers who are then given further 
indoctrination, and used to terrorise the population with political murders. 
The Bassij, or religious police, are a subsidiary, and were particularly active 
in the April crisis.  
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However, while not being averse to beating up students in the street, the 
generals of Pasdaran have said that they would not be a party to the over-
throw of the President, and Khamenei also said clearly that he opposed mili-
tary interference in politics. The key to this apparent contradiction is the fear 
that the regular Army might mount a coup, which Khamenei would not be 
able to control. After all, one of the original missions of Pasdaran was to 
prevent such a coup. In this way the two armies have neutralised one 
another. It is also interesting to note that Khatami got votes, not only from 
the Army but even from Pasdaran; the conservatives are unable to rely 
whole-heartedly even on their own Revolutionary Guard. 
1.6 Conservative and Reformist Strategies 
1.6.1 Legitimacy 
In the period before Khatami was elected president in 1997, the reformists 
were not taken seriously. The elections showed everybody that something 
very serious was afoot; Khatami received support from various quarters; the 
media, the universities, and not least women and the younger generation. 
The April counter-offensive, with the extreme use of the levers of power by 
the conservatives, points to sudden blind panic. However, the hysteria and 
violence of the conservative reaction did not have much effect on the second 
round of voting for the Majlis. The closure of newspapers, punishment of 
leading reformists and imprisonment and murder of demonstrating students 
turned out to be extremely counter-productive.  
On the other hand, Iran is not Algeria. Not only is there no strategy of un-
limited repression and violence from above, but there is no strategy of un-
limited insurrection from below (insofar as we can talk about ‘below’ when 
the leader is the President). Both sides are exhibiting great restraint. We shall 
now look at the strange diarchy of the two leaders, Sayyeed Mohammed 
Khatami and Ali Khamenei, their options and their choices.  
Ruhollah Khomeini legitimised his political absolutism through his 
supreme religious position as the spiritual leader of Iranian Shi’i Muslims. 
He held the rare title ayatollah al-uzma, or Grand Ayatollah; this is not gran-
ted by any official body, but is generated by learning, personal charisma and 
popular admiration. (No one in Iran held this title after him.) Later he was 
hailed as Imam, with echoes of the Hidden Imam of Twelver mysticism. 
Khamenei, however, had not even ‘made ayatollah’ at the time of his 
appointment, he is no great theologian, enjoys no widespread support and 
has no personal charisma. He has attempted to compensate for his lack of 
religious scholarship and experience and thus his complete disqualification 
for being the spiritual leader of the Shi’a (marja-e taqlid) by demanding an 
absolute obedience to the laws and rules promulgated by his dictatorship. 
The original concept of the velayat-e faqih was that responsibility for day-to-
day politics was to be vested in the President and the Majlis, while the 
Supreme Leader should exercise final supervision that nothing was done in 
contravention of Islam. Partly for this reason, Khomeini did not condescend 
to notice details. The infrequency of his pronouncements made them all the 
more respected as divinely inspired. In contrast, it is the general perception 
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that Khamenei is not only unqualified, but also lacks vision and meddles far 
too much with the details of policy. It is a widespread perception that his 
regime lacks the religious authority to interpret the shari’a and thereby apply 
it to practical politics. Partly for this reason, many of the clergy have become 
quite disillusioned with their political role, and would prefer to retreat to the 
traditional Shi’i passivity. 
Khatami, on the other hand, has his legitimacy outside the theocracy 
altogether, namely by popular election. By emphasising the role of the 
democratically elected Presidency and the Majlis at the expense of the 
Supreme Leader, Khatami is creating a legitimising process new to Iran. The 
Shah, of course, was a dictator and the son of a coup-maker, while popular 
sovereignty had no place in the original revolutionary ideas – or rather (since 
the revolution was made by both Islamists and leftists) the revolutionary 
ideas that got the upper hand. The will of God cannot be subject to a head-
count, but can only be discerned by the wisdom of the most learned of the 
clerics. If the doctrine of velayat-e faqih was controversial in 1979 it is even 
more so now. Most of Iranian society now agree that their government 
should derive its legitimacy not from Islam alone, but also from the confi-
dence of the people as manifested in democratic elections. (Many Sunni 
Muslims would say that this is good Islamic doctrine, however little it is 
actually practiced by Sunni governments.) This consensus may be seen from 
the result of the 1997 election, because Khatami was running against the 
candidate explicitly backed by Khamenei, who is supposed to have the job of 
knowing the will of God. This was a massive vote of no confidence not only 
in Khamenei as an individual but in the cornerstone of Khomeini’s whole 
revolutionary theory.  
Popular sovereignty expressed through free elections is all the more 
important to the reformers because they do not have much else. Although the 
head of state and supposedly the head of the executive branch, Khatami does 
not have control of the religious-governmental institutions created in the 
wake of the Revolution. Moreover, popular legitimacy can be evanescent. 
Up to now Khatami has surfed the waves of political emotion and excite-
ment. But he lacks not only control of the instruments of coercion but any-
thing resembling a grass-roots organisation. Political parties in the Western 
sense are not allowed in theocracies. His most important support was the 
liberal press, but April showed its vulnerability, when the outgoing parlia-
ment passed a regressive press law and cracked down on dissident newspap-
ers, editors and journalists.  
1.6.2 Crisis-mongering and restraint 
It should not be thought that Khamenei is waging all-out war on Khatami. 
On the contrary, his role is far more complex than that. On the one hand, he 
has been whipping up the conservative forces against the press and the stu-
dents, defending the Bassij, Pasdaran and the role of the clergy. His state-
controlled television dwells lovingly on street demonstrations with blood-
thirsty calls for revolutionary justice. On the other hand, he has been oppos-
ing attempts to subvert the Constitution and make it even more undemocratic 
than it already is. For example, in April he opposed the proposal of 
Rafsanjani’s Expediency Council to restrict the power of the Majlis and 
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forbid it to interfere with the institutions answering to the Supreme Leader. 
Similarly, he put the brakes on the Council of Guardians when it tried to 
annul the results of the election wholesale. Its first endeavours in this direc-
tion had led to rioting in a couple of provincial cities, and when it looked as 
if it would annul the results in Teheran itself, Khamenei intervened, limiting 
its interference to some minor adjustments here and there. If Khatami’s best 
supporters had all been disqualified, and the president perhaps forced to 
resign, the country might have exploded in violence. Khamenei even went so 
far as to make declarations in support of democratic principles, press free-
dom and the rule of law.  
The hard-liners have therefore every reason to be disappointed with 
Khamenei. An uncharitable interpretation is that he is running with the hares 
and hunting with the hounds; a more sympathetic view might be that he is 
trying to restrain the most hawkish of the theocrats. He cannot do this unless 
he tells them some of what they want to hear, and allows them to do some of 
the things they want to. His speech of 20 April was rhetorically extreme, but 
extreme rhetoric is nothing new in Iran, and it should be remembered that 
the nation has some very real wounds that it blames on the United States, as 
for instance the Shah’s repression and the appalling casualties of the First 
Gulf War. Inflammatory rhetoric is one thing, but Khamenei has been trying 
to keep the actual violence within limits: we have seen no tanks on the 
streets, for example. In April there was real fear of a military coup, but the 
conservatives contented themselves with their ‘jurisprudential’ coup of 
newspaper closures and show trials. Khamenei is surely aware that re-
pression on the Algerian scale would also have consequences on the Alger-
ian scale. This is, of course, a very dangerous game, of which he can lose 
control at any moment. 
For his part, Khatami is also painfully aware of the likely consequences 
of crisis-maximising. Chaos and violence would serve not his interests, but 
those of the hard-liners, and probably lead to the abolition of Iranian demo-
cracy, such as it is. He therefore confines himself to appeals for calm, pati-
ence and dialogue. Not even when the April crisis was at its hottest, for ex-
ample, did he engage in polemics with his tormentor Khamenei. He posses-
sed few levers of power to neutralise the conservative counter-offensive, and 
probably thought it best to wait until the new parliament convened. Watch-
ing the one liberal paper after the other be shut down must have been very 
hard for him, but if he was to stay within the Constitution there was little he 
could do; the closures were lawful, thanks to the Parthian shot of the outgo-
ing Majlis. Time will tell whether the new deputies will help him redress the 
balance. Even though most of the new ones are reformists, he cannot take 
them for granted. His restrained line may well have lost him the support of 
the more hot-headed democrats, but he may be beating Khamenei at his own 
game, that of posing as the conciliator and holder of the balance between 
conservatives and liberals. 
We might say that both sides are following a minimalist strategy. The 
conservatives are pulling their punches, in the last analysis they allowed 
Khatami to be president and most of his supporters to take their seats in the 
Majlis. This can only serve to strengthen democratic institutions. Khatami, 
by refraining from starting an outright insurrection, has succeeded in 
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creating an alternative centre of power. Although Khamenei is still Supreme 
Leader, he will have to put up with playing second violin. The Iranian 
Islamic Republic has thus become a peculiar hybrid of parliamentary 
democracy and theocratic dictatorship. Neither side has yet won, but neither 
side has yet lost either. However, Khatami is personally short of time: not 
only is he up for re-election in June 2001, but he suffers from heart trouble.  
1.6.3 The uneasy diarchy 
Other states have functioned as diarchies, with two rulers that have to work 
together or see total paralysis: Sparta had its two kings, and the Romans their 
two consuls. France has its ‘cohabiting’ president and prime minister. The 
same thing has come to pass in Iran. We do not know whether Khatami and 
Khamenei have some sort of ‘hot line’, but it is clear that the situation com-
pels them to observe some sort of ground rules in order to prevent violence 
and civil war. Neither has anything to gain by allowing an escalation of the 
conflict that could destroy either or both of them, and each needs the other to 
restrain his hotheads. Khatami keeps his impatient students on a leash, and 
Khamenei squashes the most outrageously undemocratic initiatives from the 
Council of Guardians and Rafsanjani. While the new Majlis is more progres-
sive than the old one, it is equally possible that we may see a centrist domi-
nance that prevents either side from triumphing; 173 deputies form a block-
ing minority.  
1.7 Civil Society 
Although the Iranian Islamic Republic has many features of a dictatorship 
and a tyranny, the fact that its Supreme Leader could be publicly defeated 
and humiliated shows that the country nevertheless does possess a civil soci-
ety and a strong democratic awareness. Iran’s current Constitution contains 
both secular-democratic and theocratic elements. Khomeini was not a con-
ventional totalitarian, in that at one and the same time he emphasised demo-
cratic elections and forbade political parties, proclaimed the controlling 
power of the faqih, himself, over all legislation but encouraged everyone to 
take part in social and political activities. The fact that the Revolution did 
not actually abolish democratic institutions, but rather erected new, religious 
ones next to them, is of great value in the present process of transformation. 
For these democratic institutions can be gradually given a new content, 
while the religious ones are gradually emptied of content, but allowed to 
continue with a symbolic function, in other words, the mirror image of the 
Revolution’s own method. Such a ‘dissolving view’ serves to soften the 
polarisation of the struggle for power.  
We will now discuss three structural factors that have been largely re-
sponsible for the development of civil society.  
1.7.1 The demographic and educational explosions 
The factor that more than any other guarantees that Iranian reformism will 
continue is demography. During the First Gulf War, Khomeini made it offi-
cial policy to give all possible encouragement to parents to produce new 
children for the holy war against Iraq. These are now growing up, and will 
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be setting the agenda in a country in which the majority of the population is 
under 25. This kind of demographic bulge has produced revolutions and vio-
lence in other countries, not least in Algeria. However, there is evidence that 
the present generation of Iranian students possesses a degree of political self-
discipline. While not all of them liked Khatami’s gentle and conciliatory re-
sponse to the conservative counter-offensive, it was clear that the students as 
a body were determined not to repeat the tactical mistake of 1998, when they 
took to the streets and thus got blamed for disorder. If the conservatives have 
a monopoly of violence, that means a monopoly of the moral odium too. On 
the other hand, the young have great expectations, and an acute need for an 
improved economy that can provide them with work.  
A surplus of youngsters is always a force for change, but is not a suffici-
ent condition for the development of civil society. Of greater relevance is the 
explosion in education under the Republic. The educational explosion in Iran 
means that the ideology on which the revolution was based, is doomed. Edu-
cation cannot but cause people to ask questions about the top-down hier-
archy of the velayat-e faqih. The more education a person has, the less in-
clined he is to let others do the reading and interpreting of the sacred texts on 
his behalf. The extension of the clerical monopoly of scriptural exegesis and 
religious law to political power becomes a greater and greater archaism. The 
Iranian middle class has been the standard-bearer of liberal and democratic 
ideas for many generations, back to Mossadeq and the Constitution of 1906; 
the tremendous increase in the educational establishment has served to make 
this enlightened middle class very much larger.  
It is a paradox that the policy of popular mobilisation for the Revolution 
has backfired. The masses were mobilised, all right, but not necessarily for 
the purposes of the clergy. When you mobilise people, as Khomeini did, to 
both education and public participation, you cannot predict what that educa-
tion will teach them or what they will wish to do in the public space once 
they have mastered it. He thus unleashed forces which his less cunning and 
charismatic successor has little chance of controlling. 
The slogans of 1979, such as ‘the Islamic system’, ‘the Islamic eco-
nomy’, ‘Islamic banking’ and so forth, sounded very exciting at the time, but 
a university-educated population facing unemployment is hard to convince 
for long that the solution to the problems of the modern economy is to be 
found in the Qur’an. This applies not only to the academics but also to the 
bazaaris – the older generation helped to make the Revolution, but their 
children are more likely to reject protectionism and see their future prosper-
ity in a liberalised and globalised economy.  
Both the failure of the Revolution to deliver living standards and the 
higher educational level have rendered more and more people unable to be-
lieve in the revolutionary nostrums – whether they did at the time, or were 
not even born then. In conversation, the leading reformer Sourush told us 
that the doctrine of velayat-e faqih is not openly challenged, because it is too 
dangerous to do so; but that does not mean anyone takes it seriously. It is a 
shibboleth, everyone must pay lip service to it but almost no one believes in 
it any longer.  
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1.7.2 The role of women 
Concepts of the Islamic family are based on patterns of clan society, in 
which the family has many fundamental functions. Social morality is a 
reflection of family morality, and for this reason the role of women is highly 
politicised. The Muslim woman bears a heavy responsibility for marking a 
distance from Western culture, in which the family has well-nigh collapsed, 
and in which moral decay is attributed to women’s liberation.  
Although the female role is primarily related to the home, in most Mus-
lim countries women have not been excluded from the workplace altogether. 
The flashpoints tend to be her subordination to the man (that is, a woman 
cannot have a job that involves giving men orders), the dress code and work-
place relations between the sexes in general. More and more women have 
been taking higher education, so much so that a majority of Iranian univer-
sity students are now female. A natural concomitant of this has been greater 
female involvement in business and politics. It may seem a paradox that it 
has been under the Islamic Republic that Iranian women have emerged in the 
greatest numbers from their traditional roles of wife, mother and grand-
mother. But Islamism is not the same thing as traditional Muslim society, 
and has legitimised female participation in public life; revolutionary Islamic 
mobilisation means that also women can and should join organisations, hold 
meetings and publish articles. It was, after all, the Prophet who called for 
everyone to take an active part in society. In this way the Islamists have 
moved faster than some Muslim secularists. 
This development has had major political consequences. Women are no 
longer passive accessories, they are not subject to male authority in the same 
way; for instance, men can no longer tell their wives how to vote and the 
right of the husband to take family decisions alone is under attack.  
Another paradox is that the hijab, ‘Islamic dress’ (of which the chador is 
the best-known variant), standing for modesty and control, has made it easier 
for women to move in the public space. In the Revolution, for example, 
women who were by no means Islamists wore the chador to stop the Shah’s 
secret police from identifying them. By appeasing male anxieties with the 
chador, women can present female participation as less threatening. Another 
aspect of this issue is foreign policy and the escape from Iran’s self-imposed 
isolation. There is a heated debate as to whether it is right to compel visiting 
foreigners to wear the chador too: one side thinks it is strangling the tourist 
trade, the other that conceding this point would lead to the unravelling of 
Muslim morality. Khomeini had a holistic view of his religion, that is, all 
elements were equally important, and legislated the chador as compulsory as 
soon as he came to power. Khatami, on the other hand, thinks some things 
are more important than others. He is prepared to interpret the Qur’an in the 
light of social developments, and can conceive of an Islam without veiling of 
women. 
Moreover, the fact that the chador and other forms of veiling of women is 
controversial – both in Iran and in other countries, such as Turkey and 
France (the schoolgirls’ headscarf issue) – has helped to put the identity of 
the Muslim woman on the map. Many modern Iranian women see benefits to 
the chador, but they wish to decide for themselves whether to wear it, and 
not be harassed by self-important religious police in the street. This is symp-
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tomatic of the shift from the collective morality of the Revolution to the indi-
vidual morality of the secular society. Paradoxically, therefore, the chador, 
which enabled women to sally out and occupy the public space, may end up 
abolishing itself.  
1.7.3 Freedom of speech 
The question of freedom of speech has always been controversial in Islam. 
The ‘umma, the community of believers, has a collective responsibility to 
ensure that the will of God is not opposed. Infidel or disrespectful speech 
about Islam, the Prophet, and the Qur’an is not tolerated.  
In principle the Constitution of 1979 guaranteed the freedom of the press, 
with the exception of material prejudicial to religion and public morals. Dur-
ing the ‘freedom spring’, there were as many as 260 newspapers, both gov-
ernment-controlled and not. However, Khomeini soon did the same to the 
freedom of the press as the Pahlavi monarchs had. His government made it 
clear that no debate would be permitted on the form, content and legitimacy 
of the Republic. The number of papers was drastically reduced, to only 66 
‘legal’ organs in 1982. Now, however, there are around 1,300 publications of 
various kinds. The Islamic Republic’s News Agency is also a mouthpiece of 
reform. Moreover, this supposedly oppressed society is making some of the 
world’s best films. 
When Khatami was forced out as Minister of Culture in 1992, it was, 
inter alia, because he had protested against the restriction of press freedom, 
which he considered un-Islamic. Since his election to the presidency five 
years later, public debate has blossomed. Our impression is that the political 
and ideological debate is livelier than in Western countries, and that it is not 
limited to the urban elites but involves the masses too. In his term of office 
Khatami has succeeded in creating an alternative political discourse, a criti-
cal internal debate about the relationship of Islam to democracy. The whole 
liberal press is regarded by the conservatives as Khatami’s long arm. They 
see a symbiosis; the liberal papers he supports helped bring him to power. 
The Supreme Leader also controls the radio and TV and uses them to trans-
mit the dogmatic and absolutist thinking of the theocracy, in competition 
with the democracy and pluralism of the News Agency and the broadsheets.  
On the one hand, what the reformers call a ‘new interpretation’ can be 
justified on the basis of the Revolution’s idea that a country’s ideology 
should be discussed and reinterpreted in the light of changed political condi-
tions. On the other hand, this idea has been restricted by the concept of disre-
spect to Islam, and by the clergy’s vested interest in secrecy. For example, 
the Council of Guardians, six of whose members are elected by the Majlis 
but the other six appointed by the Supreme Leader, always attempts to stay 
out of the limelight and control from the shadows. Freedom of speech is also 
a threat to those who have abused their position for personal enrichment, 
such as Rafsanjani, and to all unaccountable privilege in general. 
1.8 Khatami, the Iranian Gorbachev? 
The fact that President Khatami is part of the system and aims to retain what 
he considers its essence, while introducing new methods and new policies, 
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has caused a good deal of journalistic ink to be split on comparisons with 
Mikhail Gorbachev. Three more or less explicit ideas lurk in this parallel: 
first, that Khatami is trying to patch a sinking ship; second, that he may be 
rapidly overtaken and sidelined by more radical reformers, one of whom is 
the corresponding Iranian Boris Yeltsin, ready for his moment of destiny on 
top of a tank; and, third, that Islamism is like Communism, doomed to be 
swept away entirely.  
1.8.1 Khatami as the optimistic tinkerer 
The two most important facts about Gorbachev were that, one, he was a civi-
lised man who had a genuine horror of state violence and repression, but, 
two, he never had the slightest idea what a market economy actually was or 
much desire to find out. Perestroika essentially meant tinkering with the 
system, weeding out some abuses here and fine-tuning some bureaucracies 
there. He believed to the end that a freer and more open political system 
could co-exist with collective property and the planned economy, and that he 
himself could manage the transition. Events appeared to prove him wrong. 
The system of which he was a part rotted away underneath him and took him 
with it.  
In the same way as with glasnost and perestroika, it is unclear what the 
Iranian reforms actually mean. Many of the terms that Khatami uses are very 
vague. He adopts important parts of the democratic discourse but attempts to 
combine them with the discourse of Islamic revolution. He wishes to create a 
society that is democratic, but at the same time with an Iranian and/or Isla-
mic twist that will make it unlike the democracies of the West. There is no 
question of excluding religion from the public space, or, like Atatürk, con-
fining it to the private sphere. In contrast, what Khatami is attempting is to 
interpret the message of religious revolution in the light of the fundamental 
structural changes in Iran that have taken place over the last twenty years – 
as, for instance, the huge number of university-educated women and men 
who want both a better life and less moralistic policing.  
Khatami is at his clearest when speaking on the freedom of the press and 
public debate, but also as regards social reform, civil society and the rule of 
law. His economic policy is by contrast much more diffuse: he is against 
corruption, and in favour of more aid to the poor, and takes a liberal line on 
wealth creation and foreign investment. These emphases are very remini-
scent of Gorbachev at his most appealing. On the other hand, just as no one 
ever heard Gorbachev say that the overthrow of the tsar had been a bad 
thing, so too Khatami has never been heard to question Khamenei’s leader-
ship – neither his political legitimacy as the heir of Khomeini nor his role as 
faqih (even though Khatami is actually more qualified to be one). Nor is 
Khatami proposing to abolish the velayat-e faqih, only to prune it round the 
edges. He wants not only an open political debate, but to reform the legal 
system, and it is here his position becomes ambivalent. For just as the public 
ownership of property was the defining feature of Communism that 
Gorbachev never challenged, the religious control of the law and the courts 
is the defining feature of theocracy. If Khatami does not tackle this ‘religi-
ous-jurisprudential complex’, then he cannot bring about the rule of law, but 
if he does, then what is left of the Islamic revolution? In the same way, he 
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may argue that political questions should be solved within a rational political 
framework. This sounds like a hidden polemic against the mystical and 
metaphysical foundations of Islamism, but if so, what is separating him from 
a Western secularist who leaves his religious faith at home? 
Another useful comparison with Gorbachev is the enthusiasm the West-
ern media display for President Khatami without actually knowing very 
much about him. His humanism, such a pleasing contrast to the harsh and 
glowering Khomeini, has not only had great appeal inside Iran but has also 
created a positive image in the West, so much so as to break through the 
stereotype of ‘mad mullahs’ and induce Westerners to start thinking new 
thoughts about the country in general. However, Western media talk about 
‘Khatami versus the ayatollahs’ without apparently remembering that he is 
one himself, and that the ideological split runs not between the clergy and 
everyone else, but down the middle of the clergy. Similarly, the media take it 
for granted that they know what Khatami means by democracy, civil society, 
minority rights and human rights. Even if his own idea of these things were 
clear, it would not necessarily be the same as the Western idea. It should 
inspire caution that the reformers’ preferred term is ‘the religious- democra-
tic state’. This is the coinage of Abdul Karim Sorush, a previous chief ideo-
logist but now deprived of his university post.  
1.8.2 Losing control  
Khatami is challenging entrenched institutions, including agencies of coer-
cion, with the very fragile weapon of popular sentiment. He has great pre-
stige, but as Stalin used to ask, How many divisions has the Pope? Riding a 
wave of popularity is all very well, but if that support evaporates, he has no 
other power base on which to fall back. The Iranian presidency is quite 
unlike those of other countries, in that it does not fully control the state appa-
ratus, certainly not against the will of the Supreme Leader and the Council of 
Guardians. Nor does the President have his own party organisation in either 
the country or the Majlis, and his main vehicle, the free press, has been 
emasculated. If Khatami cannot convert his political mandate into real 
change on the ground, for example the creation of new institutions, the rule 
of law and (most difficult of all) better economic conditions for the man and 
the woman in the street, then his reformism may burst like a soap bubble.  
The President may be swept aside either by the conservatives or by the 
radicals. As we have seen above, the conservatives have it in their power to 
suppress reform with even greater brutality, but have not used it. They have 
pulled their punches, apparently because the more realistic among them, 
such as Khamenei, know that this is the road to chaos and even civil war. 
Time is not on their side, so the longer they wait, the less chance they have 
of restoring the old system. The younger generation did not experience the 
tyranny of the shah and do not remember the revolution; there is no reason to 
think their younger brothers and sisters will be any fonder of the theocrats. 
Above all, aggression against those who have profited from power and posi-
tion in an inefficient state apparatus will continue to grow. This applies not 
only to the clergy themselves, but the other pillar of the Revolution, the 
bazaaris. The allocation of bureaucratic office not on merit but on the basis 
of the number of pilgrimages to Mecca cannot but depress the condition of 
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the people, and if anyone doubted that the people had realised this, the 80% 
vote for Khatami should have opened their eyes. Khatami is not just leading 
from the top, he is being driven forward by profound structural changes in 
Iranian society that are happening independently of the political system and 
whether or not they are desired by whoever is in power.  
Any more action by the conservatives will therefore be likely to provoke 
the very thing they fear, namely an even more radical reform movement. In 
this way they are, perhaps, not unlike the Soviet old guard that made fools of 
themselves with their coup against Gorbachev – they did indeed destroy him, 
but they destroyed themselves very effectively too. The conservatives no 
longer have the positive power to create an Iran in their image: their choice 
is between the two negative powers, either to precipitate a bloodbath, or to 
continue their ‘minimum’ strategy of disarming Khatami’s free press and 
delaying the reform process – but in the ultimate hope of what? 
Khatami’s strategy of calling for calm is not, therefore, as weak as it 
looks; for the subtle implication is ‘Think what might happen if I stopped 
doing this’. The fact that the conservatives have held some of their fire may 
mean that they have read this message correctly. Iranian students, and the 
young in general, are very impatient. The terrible competition for jobs that 
comes with a population-boom demography can only be eased by very rapid 
and healthy economic growth, and that in turn means rapprochement with 
the West, for both trade and investment. If Khatami cannot deliver, they will 
find someone who will, or break out in despairing violence like the Algeri-
ans. Many revolutions are made by students, and the 1979 one was no excep-
tion. The future leader who jumps on a tank to harangue a huge crowd is as 
likely to be a frustrated graduate as anyone else. But the comparison with 
Moscow 1991 is weak, as Yeltsin was no student leader but the president of 
Russia. 
1.8.3 Communism and Islamism, similarities and differences 
If Khatami is somewhat reminiscent of Gorbachev, being a ‘nice guy’ trying 
to reform an entrenched system from within, and hoping not to be ousted by 
a coup or outbid by more radical elements (although we do not see any Iran-
ian Yeltsin yet), what of the further implication that Islamism functions like 
Communism and may disappear in the same way? 
There are, it is true, points of similarity. For example, one might compare 
Communism’s ‘classless society’, which was at once mankind’s idyllic past 
and its promised future, with the ‘Medinan society’, that is, the embryonic 
Muslim fellowship created by the Prophet in the city now known as Medina. 
This was a real historical period, although whether life under Mohammed’s 
rule was quite as paradisiaical as the propaganda claims is another matter. 
Islamism has made Medina into a ‘myth of origin’ and glorified it to the 
point of unrecognisability, making it as utopian as the New Jerusalem or, in-
deed, the classless society.  
Another point of similarity is the way both ideologies are holistic and 
dichotomous at the same time: holistic in the sense that they explain every-
thing, and dichotomous in that they divide everyone into two camps – ‘Who 
is not with us, is against us’. Islam has always considered the world to be 
split into dar al-islam, the House of Islam (or submission – to the shari’a), 
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and dar al-harb, the House of War, but opinions as to how violent and 
relentless the jihad needs to be has varied widely, Islamism being histori-
cally the latest of a series of expansionistic movements. In the same way as 
Communism wanted proletarian (or Soviet) identity to supersede all ethni-
city, language, culture and so on, the ‘umma is supposed to take precedence 
over all other human differences – with about the same degree of success. 
For Khomeini, national boundaries were fictitious, all national states, in-
cluding the Muslim ones, were illegitimate, and destruction of these entities 
by violence and subversion was praiseworthy. Like the Leninists, he showed 
that he could deploy fifth columns in the heart of enemy territory.  
It is a further point of comparison that the two presidents are operating 
from within this ideological system, though it should be remembered that 
Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader born after the Revolution, whereas 
Khatami was a player in his. Initially, Gorbachev was, like Khatami, an 
‘essentialist’, who attempted to keep some things, reinterpret some things 
and throw away others. Khatami, for example, fully supports Khomenei’s 
idea of the Islamic Renaissance, a restoration of the Medinan utopia.  
 It might be said that Khatami is in fact subverting the ideology in its own 
terms. The reformers’ ‘interpretations’ and adjustments always stay within 
the framework of the revolutionary ideology, but they sometimes hoist the 
revolutionaries with their own petards, as for example when they deploy 
Khomeini’s rhetoric of political liberation. By promoting the masses’ influ-
ence and participation, Khatami is giving Khomeini’s myth-making a real 
content, enabling him to claim that the conservatives have betrayed the revo-
lution. He can, perhaps, do this more credibly than Gorbachev could claim 
that dismantling of Party rule and the state economy was what Lenin really 
had in mind.  
Having said all this, however, there is a very large and serious difference. 
Whereas it might be claimed that Communism has its roots in Christian 
equality and millenarianism (Marx didn’t invent it, he just replaced God by 
Hegelian abstractions), the two ‘religions’ were in practice bitterly opposed 
to one another. We have seen the remarkable comeback of the Russian 
Orthodox Church; suddenly Yeltsin was in church with the patriarchs and 
crossing himself.  
There is, however, no such polar opposition of Islam as a religion and 
Islamism as a political doctrine. It is more of a continuous spectrum, whose 
various points represent different opinions regarding who is entitled to im-
pose what religious sanctions on whom, and under what circumstances. The 
doctrine of velayat-e faqih may have been a new departure and an untraditio-
nal imposition, but Islam in Iran is 1400 years old, even older than Christi-
anity in Russia. Anyone who imagines that the election of Khatami, the new 
reformist Majlis, or even the demonstrating students on the street, somehow 
adds up to a repudiation of Islam as such is making a big mistake. Iran will 
continue to be an Islamic state. That is what the people want, but they also 
want a less harsh and intrusive interpretation, and an end to political and 
economic control by unelected religious scholars. The devil is, as always, in 
the details. 
Reform does not need a destructive head-on collision with all the sym-
bols and institutions of the Revolution, but can retain them and give them a 
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more moderate and democratic content. One possibility is, for example, that 
the Supreme Leader can continue to exist as the religious head, but turn into 
something more like a figurehead monarch, or the Archbishop of Canter-
bury. Khatami might achieve this in a peaceful way by influencing the com-
position of the Expert Assembly that will choose the next Supreme Leader. 
The last time round, this body was packed by Khamenei, but this does not 
always have to be so.  
1.8.4 No secular state 
The growing strength of Iranian civil society and the reaction against theo-
cracy does not mean that Islam as such is any weaker or that the country is 
headed for the kind of secularism launched by the French Revolution 
(laïcité). In the same way, the revolutionary symbols are not likely to dis-
appear altogether. What we are seeing is the retention of the symbolism but 
their assignation of new referents. Exactly what Sourush’s ‘religious-demo-
cratic state’ will look like is most unclear, but the formulation serves to send 
the message: ‘Do not imagine that we have made the Islamic Revolution for 
nothing.’ The reformers do not want to make Iran into a carbon copy of the 
West, they want to preserve something of the specifically Islamic. After all, 
Khatami himself is an ayatollah, and a better religious scholar than 
Khamenei.  
The practical result of the reforms may be something very like a Western 
democracy, but Iranians are and always have been a highly religious people. 
Their uprising against the theocracy is not a revolt against Islam, and secu-
larisation of politics is not the same as secularisation of social, cultural and 
private life.  
An illuminating comparison may be the United States, with an avowedly 
secular constitution but a population most of whom claim a personal 
relationship with God. Iranian religiosity will continue to strike secular 
Europeans as extreme; but there again, American fundamentalists strike 
them as bizarre too. Iran will continue to have its tugs of war between secu-
lar and religious principles; but the US has its struggle over public prayers 
and the teaching of evolution in schools. Religion only ceases to be a politi-
cal issue when no one believes in it very strongly.  
Part Two – Reputation and  
Ethical Expectations of the Western Oil 
Industry 
2.1 An Arbitrary Sample 
The survey data are from fieldwork carried out in Iran in April 2000. We 
conducted in-depth interviews with 14 members of the Iranian political elite 
belonging to the country’s current political opposition (see list of inter-
viewees in Appendix 1).  
Let us first make it clear that the survey does not rest on a sample in the 
statistical sense. Political science knows no inter-subjective definition of 
‘elite’ that is subject to any kind of consensus, and so the statistical universe 
cannot be defined as ‘members of the elite’. This means in turn that it is not 
possible to extract a representative sample in the statistical sense, and for our 
purposes that would not even be desirable.  
We have made an arbitrary selection of political elites that represent poli-
cies and political ideologies in competition with the Establishment, and 
which may become important for future political development. This is not a 
question of ‘snapshots’ of political attitudes as in opinion polls; our selection 
of respondents includes a dynamic aspect, that is, it tries to look forwards. 
The sample is restricted to the Iranian political opposition. After advance 
consultation with experts, we drew up a list of the most important individu-
als in the political opposition. We obtained access to 14 of these. As we 
mentioned, the interviews are ‘in-depth’ interviews that lasted on average 1 
1/2 hour, a few questions had closed reply categories, but most were open. 
This methodology involves a time-consuming subsequent coding of the re-
plies, but was nonetheless necessary, as for obvious reasons we did not know 
the reply universe. The questionnaire was nevertheless standardised, that is, 
all the interviewees received exactly the same questions. 
2.2 Sampling of Perceptions not Facts 
Since our survey is restricted to the political opposition in the country, what 
is said is clearly affected by political rhetoric. That is, we must assume that 
the interviewees’ statements are a political strategy designed to discredit the 
sitting government with a view to taking power themselves. The fact that we 
were foreigners helped to soften this aspect, because conversations with for-
eigners emphasise the informative at the expense of the agitation and dema-
gogy that dominate the domestic power struggle. However, it can easily be 
the case that what is said in oral interviews fails to match the facts. Our sur-
vey makes no attempt to measure the ‘truth quotient’. On the contrary, our 
aim is to chart not facts but perceptions. These are perceptions of the Iranian 
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political scene that, even if they are based on myths, are just as relevant as 
those based on facts. We are constantly seeing how myth-making is a power-
ful rhetorical instrument in mobilisation for an alternative political order. In 
politics the important thing is not to be right, but to be believed. The oil 
industry must therefore deal with these descriptions, whether they are true or 
not, because they are relevant to its image in Iran. 
2.3 What do We mean by ‘the Opposition’? 
Before we embark on the analysis, it is necessary to define what we mean by 
‘the political opposition’ in this context. Iran is a strange case, in that the 
political opposition occupies positions of power. This may seem like a con-
tradiction in terms, but the situation is explained in Part One: Iran is a hybrid 
of democratic and theocratic institutions, in which the latter have the whip 
hand. Uniquely, the ultimate authority is neither the President, nor the Prime 
Minister, but the supreme religious leader – it is as if the Pope not only held 
a veto on legislation but also controlled the Italian courts and deployed his 
own militia.  
For the purposes of this analysis, therefore, we are defining the ‘Iranian 
political opposition’ entirely regardless of formal relationship to the theoreti-
cal structure of government, but in ideological terms. The ‘political oppositi-
on’ is deemed to be those forces that support reforms tending to strengthen 
democratic processes and institutions, and thereby weakening the autocratic 
politics of the velayat-e faqih. Although he is of the established clergy, was 
part of the Revolution, does not polemicise against velayat-e faqih, and ac-
cepts Ayatollah Khamenei’s supremacy, President Khatami derives his legi-
timacy from popular election and is the primus motor of the reform process 
that, if it is allowed to continue, will neutralise the theocracy. The ultimate 
paradox of our method is therefore that we count the Head of State as part of 
the political opposition – although he is not on our list of interviewees. 
2.4 Nation or ’umma. The Respondents’ Own Identity  
 
Table 1 – Iranian elite identities 
(N is the number of respondents) 
Cosmopolitan 1 
Citizen of Iran 5 
Iranian first, then Muslim 4 
Iranian and Muslim 3 
Muslim first, then Iranian 1 
 N = 14 
 
In the light of the ideology underpinning the Revolution – or the ideology by 
which it was hijacked – the results of the survey of elite self-identification 
are interesting. The revolutionary ideology as formulated by Khomeini was 
directed against the national state, which was seen as a Western and anti-
Islamic invention. The primary identity should not be the national state but 
the ‘umma, the community of believers. 
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On the basis of their ideology – breaking with the theocratic system im-
posed by Khomeini and still dominating Iranian politics – we have classified 
the respondents as belonging to the political opposition. By opposing theo-
cracy, they are also opposing the idea that they are primarily Muslims and 
everything else should be subordinate to this. The majority of the respon-
dents define the Iranian national state as their primary identity. Pragmatically 
and narrowly defined, this means orienting themselves away from a politics 
based on religion and religious duties to a politics based on the rights of indi-
viduals and the interests of the nation. For the political opposition, the theo-
cratic system is bankrupt; the revolutionary rhetoric has lost its power, 
people no longer identify with it. Once potent symbols from the revolutio-
nary period have lost their meaning. No one is talking about ‘Islamic econo-
mic systems’ and ‘Islamic banking’, they have understood that these are just 
castles in the air with no relevance to the complex challenges of the modern 
economy. The same goes for the ‘Islamic university’. There is also a great 
majority opposed to the velayat-e faqih, but here no one is saying it aloud, 
because the consequences of attacking this cornerstone can be literally fatal. 
The interviewees desire a new interpretation of Islam, especially the role of 
Islam in politics. This does not necessarily mean supporting a secular state, 
but the incorporation of an Islamic ethical system into the politics of the 
national state.  
All the above notwithstanding, it seems that Iranian nationalism is closely 
tied to Islam. Even if the interviewees call ‘Iranian’ their first identity, this 
does not mean that Islam is not an important component of their identity too. 
They made this quite clear to us. For this reason some chose our ‘both-and’ 
rubric, they reckoned it was not possible to say that the one was more impor-
tant than the other, they were two sides of the same coin.  
Judging by our respondents, the term ‘Iranian’ actually means being both 
a citizen of the Iranian national state and being a Muslim. It is not, therefore, 
at all like the French national concept based on the rights and duties of citi-
zenship and strictly confining religion to the private sphere. The interview-
ees are not advocating a secular state, nor yet the multicultural society with 
different religions and ethnic groups. In its suppression of ethnicity at least, 
Iran is undeniably akin to France. For example, the interviewees consider the 
perception of the Azeri minority as a special ethnic group within the state 
and aspiring to a certain autonomy to be ludicrous and a fantasy; the Azeris 
are as one with the Iranian nation, we were told. Individuals of Azeri back-
ground played an important role in the formulation of the Iranian constitu-
tion. Unlike the Azeris of Azerbaijan, who are not sure whether they are 
Azerbaijanis or Turks, the Iranian Azeris have no affiliation with Turkey or 
pan-Turkism. Not even the fact that they speak more or less the same lan-
guage as the Turks can alter this. All hints about suppression of ethnicity and 
religion were dismissed. 
2.5 The Respondents on Forces for Change in Iran 
The current struggle between the national-democratic forces and the uphold-
ers of the religious dictatorship means that Iran in effect has two competing 
governments, the ‘open’ and the ‘hidden’. In the ‘open government’ 
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Khatami is in charge; it is with representatives of this government that for-
eigners have dealings, especially oil companies negotiating contracts. The 
‘hidden’ government under Khamenei rests on the institutional power struc-
ture as enshrined in the revolutionary constitution. The political conflicts in 
Iranian society take the form of ‘competition’ between these two govern-
ments.  
The respondents presented Iran as a society in transformation. Iran has 
undergone profound structural and political changes, so that the present situ-
ation is quite different from 1979. It is true that the theocracy is still formally 
in power, and in real terms partially so; but it is under challenge. If 
Khamenei pulls out all the stops in his opposition to the democratic move-
ment, it will destabilise the country and lead to chaos, but the forces for 
change will not be stopped by that. The most Khamenei can do is postpone 
and slow the trend.  
The driving forces in all the change most often mentioned are the educa-
tional explosion, greater equality of opportunity for women and press free-
dom. These three factors together have created a qualitatively new society 
with a very different public space. Public debate has cleared the way for in-
novative thinking and reinterpretation of the role of Islam in the current poli-
tical system. Critical debate and pluralistic thinking are the solvent of the 
mind-set of totalitarianism. The respondents also thought that increasing 
industrialisation and urbanisation helped to create a larger middle class and 
thereby the preconditions for a more modern and pluralistic outlook. Tradi-
tionally the Iranian middle class has been oriented towards democracy and 
pluralism, and all the revolutionary propaganda has not much changed this. 
In this way the middle class is a natural enemy of the dictatorship. The inter-
viewees claimed that the Qur’an cannot provide answers to everything, such 
as the problems of the modern economy. 
A surprising number mentioned international influence as an important 
factor in stimulating change. Globalisation was a word we heard often, usu-
ally in the sense that globalisation forces democratic development and re-
spect for human rights.  
The fact that President Khatami has formulated an ideology that justifies 
change within the framework of Islam was emphasised as important, as was 
his decision to proceed by only moderate measures, avoiding drastic con-
frontations that can only lead to bloodshed. Khatami’s popular legitimacy 
has strengthened the principle of free elections and thus given the people 
greater power at the expense of the clergy. Political legitimacy in modern 
Iran is created by both religious learning and the will of the people.  
However, the respondents added that Khatami has not yet passed the test 
as the great reformer. Success or failure will depend entirely on his ability to 
deploy the new Majlis as an instrument of change. It was also mentioned that 
many of the deputies that Western media associate with the president in real-
ity have their enthusiasm for civil society and democracy well under control. 
They use the concepts without really understanding what they mean, or with-
out much caring.  
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2.6 Attribution of Causes of the Dictatorship  
 
Table II – Causes of the lack of democratic development 
(N is the number of statements) 
Cultural 2 
Structural 2 
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 7 
Foreign interference 8 
 N = 19 
2.6.1 Cultural and structural arguments 
Some of the explanations of the current despotism emphasised Iranian cul-
ture. It was said that Iran had always had an autocratic government. This 
negative tradition is visible in current political culture, in that people do not 
see the need for an alternative. One interviewee asserted that the authoritari-
an mentality is reflected in ordinary Farsi speech, where there are clear, but 
at the same time complex, rules for addressing people from different social 
strata. It is not to be wondered at that such a culture is readily adapted to 
autocracy. Profound cultural changes are therefore necessary before Iran can 
become a democracy.  
Structural arguments are also deployed, for example, the complete depen-
dence on a single external resource (oil) makes it easier for an autocrat to 
maintain his despotism. The first striking feature of the results generated by 
this question is the dearth of structural explanations provided by the respon-
dents. However, this does accord with the predictions of social psychology’s 
cognitive attribution models, whereby the roles of persons are magnified and 
structural causal variables minimised – especially where this offers a chance 
to ‘blame’ external agents.  
2.6.2 The yoke of the Islamic Revolution 
The lack of democracy was attributed to a greater degree to the ideological 
legacy of the Revolution, namely a glorification of religious dictatorship. 
Many of the interviewees explained this in terms of the revolution they 
themselves had helped to make being hijacked both politically and religi-
ously (see Chapter 1.1) and ending up at a quite different destination than 
they had in mind when they joined it. They had advocated the modernisation 
of Iran, and the ‘destructive’ aspect of the Revolution, the overthrow of the 
Shah, was a success, but then it lacked a ‘constructive’ aspect, there was no 
vision of what was to be done after the departure of the Shah. In this ideo-
logical vacuum, the revolution was taken over by the clergy and the bazaaris 
and a new ideology was created, this time hostile to democratic develop-
ment.  
2.6.3 Meddling by the oil companies  
The second striking result generated by this question is the category ‘Foreign 
interference’. This should be noted by the oil industry, because it means 
much the same as ‘Western oil company interference’. In other words, when 
the political opposition is asked to explain the reasons for the religious dic-
tatorship in Iran, the single biggest cause cited is foreign meddling, and 
Daniel Heradstveit 
nupi february 01 
30 
when we look at the arguments in greater detail, we find the Western oil 
industry to be the arch-villain. The events of 1953, when Prime Minister 
Mossadeq, regarded as the foremost exponent of freedom and democracy in 
Iranian history, was overthrown in a coup d’état carried out by the Shah and 
orchestrated by the CIA, made an indelible impression.  
The Iranian perception is that Pahlavi would never have managed it with-
out the aid of the CIA, and that the reason for the coup was the American 
wish to continue controlling Iranian oil. In 1951 Mossadeq nationalised the 
considerable British oil interests. The idea that Iran could control its own oil 
resources in this way was anathema to Western oil companies and Western 
governments, which regarded it as a serious contravention of the principles 
of ‘world order’ and global trade. Such a theory was hardly weakened by the 
fact that the USA was represented in the international consortium formed 
after the coup to make contracts with the new regime. The West did not care 
that the coup also strangled Iranian democracy in its cradle, better to get 
one’s oil from a tame dictatorship than have to bargain for it with a ram-
bunctious democracy.  
The dramatic overthrow of Iran’s first democratic leader has defined 
Iran’s attitude to Western oil companies ever since. It is therefore no coinci-
dence that when the American ambassador in the spring of 2000 made a 
démarche for reconciliation between the two countries, he apologised for the 
USA’s actions in 1953. Our interviewees describe the coup as merely the tip 
of the iceberg of Western interference in Iran since the discovery of the oil. 
BP, which before Mossadeq nationalised the oil industry had (as Anglo-Iran-
ian Oil) a virtual monopoly, was described in particularly virulent terms. 
This monopoly was used, in alliance with the Shah, to safeguard its own 
interests at the expense of democratic institutions. When Mossadeq formu-
lated his slogan, ‘We must cut off the foreign hand’, it was BP he had in 
mind. Our interviewees maintained that BP had operated in classical coloni-
alist style by: 
 
1. Meddling in domestic policy 
2. Appointing its own candidates to lead the Iranian oil administration 
3. Exploiting its position to influence parliamentary elections 
4. Paying for positive media articles about BP 
5. Operating with fake invoices to avoid paying the Iranian government its 
dues 
6. Promoting corruption within the Iranian government 
7. Preventing Iran influencing the pricing of oil. What Iran received was 
minimal. 
 
2.7 Corruption and Oil in Iran 
 
Table III – Western oil companies’ impact on corruption 
(N is the number of respondents)
No impact 3 
Reduce corruption 3 
Both reduce and increase 0 
Increase corruption 8 
 N = 14 
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The most striking thing here is that corruption caused by foreign investment 
in the oil sector is not seen as a major problem. It was claimed that compared 
with other countries – and particularly the neighbours in the Persian Gulf – 
Iran is not very corrupt. Moreover, it is argued that in addition to an ongoing 
public debate on corruption, there is effective surveillance, and corrupt indi-
viduals risk losing their jobs. The respondents reminded us that the Islamic 
Revolution was an ethical and cultural affair, not just an economic one. This 
is not to say that the problem does not exist, on the contrary it was said that 
the culture of corruption is in the process of spreading, even if those on the 
top are not normally corrupt. The Revolution’s ethical programme has not 
yet been victorious; the continued existence of the culture of bribery is a de-
feat for the revolutionary goals of Islamism.  
The respondents had, however, no illusions about the oil industry. They 
reminded us that this industry by and large operates in countries where re-
gimes and cultures alike are permeated by corruption. To win contracts it is 
practically essential for the Western oil companies to participate in the cul-
ture of corruption and become a part of it. A company that becomes involved 
in Iran risks this, and it is up to the company itself whether it wants to run 
this risk. But it was also said that investments by the Western oil companies 
could reduce corruption: such investments would stimulate the development 
of private companies that would be independent of the public sector. It was 
clear from this that the respondents regard the private sector as less corrupt 
than the public; although this naturally does not apply to those companies 
that are currently private in name, but which in reality are part of the long 
arm of the State. 
The sharpest distinction drawn by the interviewees, however, was that be-
tween American and other oil companies; American companies were praised 
as the standard-bearers of ethical values. European companies, on the other 
hand, were lumped with the Arab and Japanese, where there is little reluct-
ance to become drawn into the culture of corruption. The big contract with 
Total was frequently cited as an example of what not to do when signing oil 
deals; there were persistent rumours of corruption, and if true, it means that 
the little clique that made the contract on the Iranian side will be getting very 
rich. There was no question here of public access to information, whereas 
American companies make it very clear to their Iranian partners than trans-
parency is a condition of the contract. It is claimed that the USA’s clear line 
is accepted in Iran.  
The responses sometimes appeared contradictory. The interviewees spoke 
of the absence of corruption at the top, but at the same time, when harping 
on the contract with Total, they complained of corruption in high places. 
 
2.8 The Oil Companies, Democracy and Human Rights 
 
Table IV – Western oil companies’ impact on democracy and human rights 
(N is the number of respondents) 
No impact 2 
Positive impact 4 
Both positive and negative 0 
Negative impact 8 
 N = 14 
Daniel Heradstveit 
nupi february 01 
32 
Here it was emphasised that Western oil companies, in order to safeguard 
their economic privileges, used actively to oppose democracy and human 
rights. The greatest symbol of this murky past is the overthrow of Mossadeq. 
When some Western oil companies talk about democracy and human rights, 
therefore, it is because they are forced to do so – this is not a change of heart, 
not an ethical standpoint, but merely lip service. They are happy to build a 
hospital here and organise a human-rights conference there, but there is 
nothing serious about this. One respondent said it sounded like a joke when 
the oil companies were supporting democracy and human rights. Another 
commented: ‘Your description of the oil companies’ new thinking isn’t true. 
There has been no change. We have heard some talk about a new ethics, but 
we haven’t seen any of it. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE 
demonstrate that the companies are operating in the way they always have. 
The policies of the British and American companies have undergone mini-
mal change. And it is disgusting to see that the money from the oil industry 
is spent largely on weapons even today. The companies must contribute to 
channelling the revenues into more positive projects such as bringing water 
to a region. There are, it is true, signs that the oil companies are no longer as 
willing to support the dictatorship, but the change, of course, can only be 
seen with a microscope.’ The oil companies trim to the prevailing winds, it is 
said: the globalisation agenda has its ethical items and the companies cannot 
simply ignore this, but if anything will come of it is an open question.  
As the table shows, the respondents were not unanimous. Some thought 
that Western oil investment in Iran could indirectly promote democracy and 
human rights. Western investment – which means mostly oil investment – is 
essential to improve the economy, and a better economy would create better 
conditions for democracy and human rights. 
2.9 Statoil’s Reputation in Iran 
 
Table V – Does Statoil stand out among the Western oil companies? 
(N is the number of respondents) 
Statoil is like all the others 1 
Statoil is different 3 
Statoil is very different 0 
We don’t know Statoil 10 
 N = 14 
 
We can see from the table that Statoil is not well known to our respondents, 
but the few who knew about it described the company in positive terms. It is 
a widespread perception that Scandinavians in general are less corrupt than 
‘others’, and this rubs off on Statoil. The fact that Statoil is not in alliance 
with British and American companies is a point in its favour. On the other 
hand, one of the respondents said that it was not to Statoil’s credit that it 
acted as BP’s lackey in Azerbaijan. Statoil ought to have played an indepen-
dent role and started operations in the Persian Gulf instead of Azerbaijan. A 
collaboration with Iranian companies would reinforce the positive image.  
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Norway as a country was praised for sincerity and integrity, but inter-
viewees also mentioned what they called its ‘prejudiced’ policy vis-à-vis 
Iran.  
The respondents clearly felt their lack of knowledge of Statoil as embar-
rassing, but excused themselves by saying that most of its operations were in 
the North Sea and for that reason it can hardly be called an international 
company.  
It is an obvious advantage that Statoil, unlike most other oil companies, 
has no skeletons in its cupboard. The fact that the company is already active 
in the region, namely in Azerbaijan, leads to increased interest among Irani-
ans, but a condition must be that the company has capital and can compete 
with others. Iran will be the future energy centre of the Gulf, and if Statoil 
wants to be an international player it must act quickly. As soon as sanctions 
are lifted, competition from American companies will be strong – we were 
told that exploratory talks with companies like Exxon-Mobil and Conoco 
were already under way.  
It was also said that Statoil has little reason to fear terrorism in Iran, be-
cause Norway is not associated with states which have committed crimes in 
Iran, such as the UK and the USA. It was the general opinion that the danger 
of terrorist action against the Western oil industry in Iran was minimal, but 
that if it does happen, it will come from the far right. Up to now, the severe 
economic consequences of any such action against Western companies have 
prevented it happening.  
2.10 The Interviewees’ Prescriptive Analysis 
2.10.1 Corruption 
 
Table VI – What should the oil companies do to fight corruption? 
(N is the number of statements) 
The oil companies must avoid being corrupt themselves 3 
The oil companies must combat Iranian corruption indirectly, 
through education 
4 
The oil companies must deliberately strengthen the Iranian pri-
vate sector 
5 
The oil companies must themselves find out which Iranians are 
corrupt 
5 
Both government and oil companies must practice transparency 19 
Other statements 7 
 N = 43 
 
From this table it can be seen that the respondents’ main concern is the lack 
of transparency of the oil industry. They complain that no other industry, 
domestically or globally, is so unwilling to provide information as the oil in-
dustry. Moreover, corrupt despotisms in the countries where the oil industry 
operates also have an interest in keeping oil matters secret, which makes for 
a natural alliance, and such a climate in turn fosters the culture of corruption. 
The recently signed contract with Total was seen as an example of these 
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negative trends in both Total itself and in the Iranian government. They told 
us that Total has no contact with the Iranian civil society, the company insu-
lates itself completely, and it is impossible to extract information about the 
company’s operations. There was no public debate about the Total contract, 
which was made between a narrow clique of bureaucrats in the Energy Min-
istry and a few top politicians including the president. The way in which this 
was done was subsequently heavily criticised and it was stated that in future 
the Iranian civil society would demand much more transparency. Some 
found it reprehensible that the contract was made with ulterior political 
motives, it was not the market alone that decided.  
It was also emphasised that attempts by the oil industry to tackle the cor-
ruption problem by propaganda and pressure, such as sponsoring seminars in 
Iran, will be counter-productive. One interviewee stated that if the oil com-
panies tried to administer anti-corruption pills to the government, the latter 
would just spit them out again. All attempts at direct influence will be seen 
as meddling in domestic Iranian affairs, and this will make life more difficult 
for the forces within Iran which are actively working against corruption. The 
oil companies must instead work indirectly, for example by encouraging pri-
vatisation by placing their orders with private companies.  
The theme most frequently taken up by the respondents was support for 
education. There was great faith that education would make people less cor-
rupt. People in cultures with lower levels of education do not perceive cor-
ruption in the same way. One interviewee said that in France, for example, if 
a minister earned 20,000 dollars in an irregular manner he would be sacked 
on the spot, but that in Iran this would hardly be seen as a problem. Another 
respondent said that an indirect way of combating corruption was giving stu-
dent grants.  
 It was also stated that if the Western oil industry is to operate effectively 
as regards Iranian corruption, the companies must stand together and agree 
on a joint strategy; but there was little faith that this would happen. Western 
companies’ activities in the Persian Gulf clearly show that most companies 
have no scruples about making corrupt contracts. 
2.10.2 Democracy and human rights 
 
Table VII – What should the companies do (or not do) to promote demo-
cracy and human rights in Iran? 
(N is the number of statements) 
No special contact with opposition  5 
Support education  7 
Help get the Iranian economy going 11 
No interference in Iran’s domestic affairs 29 
 N = 52 
 
The most striking aspect of the results is that the respondents talk much more 
about what the oil companies should avoid doing than what they ought to do. 
Their arguments are based on what they see as the companies’ historically 
poor record in Iran. Thanks to their previous direct meddling in Iranian poli-
tics, the companies have no credibility. Campaigns, conferences and demon-
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strations for democracy and human rights that have the oil companies behind 
them will be negatively perceived and seen as interference in Iran’s internal 
affairs. Were an oil company to protest against some breach of human rights 
in Iran, we were told, it would simply be asked to leave the country.  
Poor reputation is only one reason why Western oil companies ought not 
to try to promote democracy and human rights in a direct manner. Another is 
that this would be counter-productive, weakening the forces in Iran them-
selves working for democracy and human rights. Were both the Iranian 
opposition and the oil companies to make a common protest against human-
rights violations, this would be a gift to the conservatives, who would then 
accuse the opposition of collaborating with the country’s enemies. It follows 
from this that it would be extremely undesirable for the oil companies to cul-
tivate the political opposition; this would be the kiss of death for the 
reformers.  
For these two weighty reasons, the oil companies should never make pub-
lic comments about democracy and human rights, this would hurt both them-
selves and the reformist movement. If they ever raise questions of human 
rights, this must be done discreetly and unofficially. Perhaps it will do no 
harm, there might indeed be a positive response. It was emphasised that the 
oil companies could only operate in both the Iranian minefields – corruption 
and democracy/human rights – in a very indirect manner.  
The best indirect approach was to invest in Iran. Were the economy to 
pick up, it would strengthen the Iranian middle class, which has always been 
the biggest advocate of democracy and human rights. A gradual improve-
ment of the economy would also expand contact with the West and open the 
door to globalisation, which some of the respondents thought would be con-
ducive to democracy and human rights. Support for education was the best 
weapon against corruption. In the interviewees’ opinion, such support – 
awarding of scholarships, publication subsidies and so forth – would not be 
perceived as ‘interference in Iran’s internal affairs’ in the same way, but 
would be seen positively by everyone.  
 

Appendix 1 – List of Interviewees, Teheran 
 
1. Dr Shahriar Rohani 
Political activist and adviser to President Seyyed Mohammad Khatami.  
Shahriar Rohani served as the spokesman for the committee that, after the 
Islamic Revolution, took over all Iran diplomatic and consular functions 
in the US, including at the UN. Rohani held this position for about 13 
months, after which he moved back home to become the editor in chief of 
Keyhan (Universe). At the time of the Revolution, Keyhan was the most 
popular daily with a circulation of about 400,000, which is still a record. 
Just before the Islamic Revolution, the paper was bought by a revolutio-
nary businessman, and it became a supporter of the revolution and the 
Freedom Movement (Nehzate Azadi). The Freedom Movement was a 
party founded after Mohammad Mossadeq’s fall in 1953 by Mehdi 
Bazargan and other veteran members of the National Front (Jebheie 
Melli), Mossadeq’s party. After the Revolution, disagreements with the 
clergy pushed them into opposition, where they still are, 20 years later. 
 
2. Dr Hamid Zaheri 
 An oil expert. General Manager for International Affairs of the National 
Petrochemical Company (Sherkate Mellie Petroshimi). OPEC spokesman 
from 1974 to 1983.  
 
3. Dr Alireza Tabibian 
Associate Professor at Tehran University and member of ‘The Institute 
for Research in Development and Planning’, a semi-governmental orga-
nisation. The architect of the second five-year economic plan under Ali 
Akbar Hashemi Bahremani (better known as Rafsanjani, which refers to 
the city he comes from, Rafsanjan).  
 
4. Dr Morteza Mardiha 
 An intellectual and writer. Political journalist on the daily Asre Azadegan 
(The Time of Liberals). This paper, which was shut down by the conser-
vatives in April 2000, was the successor of two dailies shut down one 
after the other, Jame-e (Society) and Neshat (Happiness). All three 
dailies, with the same editorial board, advocated the establishment and 
development of public, non-governmental media as the forth pillar of 
democratic society. Dr Mardiha is known for a pragmatic rather than an 
idealistic approach.  
 
5. Dr Abdelkarim Soroush 
 Formerly a Professor of Philosophy at Tehran University, and a member 
of the Iranian Philosophical Society (Anjomane Hekmat va Falsafeie 
Iran). Regarded by many as the leading intellectual and theorist of the re-
formist movement. He is now suspended from his professorship. His doc-
trine of compatibility between democracy and Islam, and his intellectual 
struggle against vulgar/ritualistic interpretations of the Muslim religion, 
have made him the bugbear of the conservative clergy. 
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Time Magazine has offered the following description of him: 
‘Abdelkarim Soroush, the 52-year-old philosopher who has emerged, 
reluctantly, as the Islamic republic's most dangerous dissident. Soroush 
poses such a challenge to Iran's powerful religious establishment that his 
situation is unlikely to be eased by the recent election as President of 
Mohammed Khatami, who promised more openness and freedom. 
Soroush's sin, in the eyes of the mullahs, is to question the central tenet of 
the late Ayatollah Khomeini's notion of Islamic government: that Iran's 
holy men have a God-given right to rule. That appears to go too far even 
for Khatami.’ (Time, June 23, 1997, Vol. 149, No. 25.) 
Though he is not himself a politician, his writings are inevitably interpre-
ted in a highly political way in Iran. 
 
6. Dr Alireza Rajaiee 
 Newly elected member for the 6th parliament. In a very controversial 
decision the Council of Guardians (Shoraie Negahban) declared his elec-
tion invalid. Head of the political writers of the pro-democracy daily Asre 
Azadegan (The Time of Liberals). Although not officially a member of 
any party, his candidacy for parliament was supported by a wide range of 
pro-democracy groups including student organisations. 
 
7. Mr Mohammad Torkaman 
 A political historian, writer and journalist interested particularly in oil-re-
lated events. Pro democracy and human rights. Close to the Freedom 
Movement (Nehzate Azadi). 
 
8. Mr Ali Akbar Moeenfar 
 Former minister of oil during the Bazargan government. Now an oil con-
sultant. A political activist since Mossadeq’s time as a member of the 
National Front (Jebheie Melli). After the fall of Mossadeq he joined the 
Freedom Movement (Nehzate Azadi) of which he is currently one of the 
leaders. He also joined the Islamic Society of Engineers (Anjomane 
Eslamie Mohandesin). He was elected from Tehran to the first post-revo-
lutionary parliament, where he became a member of the group opposing 
clerical rule.  
 
9. Dr Ghassem Salehkhoo 
 International financial consultant, pro democracy and human rights. 
Iran’s ambassador to Japan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Afghanistan 
and its representative to the IMF.  
 
10. Dr Morteza Nasiri 
 Lawyer, expert on international contract law, now with an office in both 
Teheran and the USA, politically close to the Freedom Movement 
(Nehzate Azadi). He has represented some Iranian national companies 
such as IranKhodro (the biggest automobile factory in Iran) as well as 
private industries in international contexts. Acted as an adviser to the 
Bazargan government.  
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11. Dr Mohsen Sazegara 
 Consultant to the President. Political activist and writer (journalist). One 
of the founders of the Revolutionary Guards (Sepahe Pasdaran), now a 
radical reformist. A member of the committee established by Khomeini 
during his exile in France. It is interesting to note that almost all the 
members of that committee are now either executed, like Sadegh 
Ghotbzadeh (the former minister of foreign affairs), or exiled, like 
Abolhassan Banisadr (the former president, now living in Paris), or be-
longing to the present opposition in Iran (Sazegara himself). The function 
of the Paris-based committee was to translate Khomeini’s speeches and 
thoughts for Western media and more generally to the entire world. In 
addition the committee designed many revolutionary policies and appro-
aches. Dr Sazegara was later one of the founders of the now closed daily 
Jame-e (Society) and is still very active in pro-democracy activities like 
managing meetings and writing critical articles in the daily press.  
 
12. Dr Parviz Varjavand 
 Leader of the National Front (Jebheie Melli) and minister of culture in the 
Bazargan government. The party goes back to Dr Mossadeq, who was 
famous for his struggle with the oil companies, particularly BP. He is also 
a political writer and professor at universities such as Islamic Azad Uni-
versity.  
 
13. Dr Hossein Zaiem 
Oil industry management and marketing expert, member of the National 
Front (Jebheie Melli), the party established by Dr Mossadeq as an um-
brella organisation for all modernisers. The main item on the agenda was 
to nationalise Iran’s oil industry. The National Front’s days of glory end-
ed with the coup of 1953, and it now lives mostly on its history and its 
heroes. 
  
14. Dr Mohammad Hosein Bani-Asadi 
Engineer. Consultant at Iran Industrial Foundation Co. Member of the 
central committee of the Freedom Movement (Nehzate Azadi). The Free-
dom Movement is the only overt opposition group in Iran that dates back 
to Khomeini’s day. The Movement was against the continuation of the 
war with Iraq and the totalitarianism of the clergy (Rohaniiat). (Rohaniiat 
is used as the proper name for the conservative body of clergy belonging 
to the establishment as opposed to Rohaniioon which has the same dictio-
nary meaning as Rohaniiat but in political usage stands for the more 
reformist part of that establishment. Khatami, for example, belongs to the 
Rohaniioon but Rafsanjani to the Rohaniiat.) 
    Dr Bani-Asadi is the son-in-law of ex-prime minister Bazargan and 
was his special adviser. He is also the founder of the Bassij militia, foun-
ded at the beginning of the Revolution. (Bassij is the name of the organi-
sation and Bassiji refers to a member.) 
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Appendix 2 – Interview Schedule for Field Research, Teheran 
Name of interviewee: 
Part I: Questions about the Western oil industry 
1 What do you think are the most important aspects of the Western oil 
industry for Iran? 
Please list only three aspects and in order of importance. 
 
2 What might lead to a worsening and what to improvement of relations 
between the Western oil industry and the political opposition?  
 
3 If the Western oil industry were to develop more intimate and friendlier 
relations with the opposition, then what do you think would happen? 
Part II: Questions about Norway 
1 What do you think about the Norwegian oil company Statoil compared to 
the other Western oil companies?  
 Is it  Much the same Different  Very different 
If you think it is different, could you describe in greater detail how it is 
different? 
2 How do you think the Western oil industry affects the struggle for demo-
cratic development and human rights in Iran? 
 Has it had  No Effect Negative Effect  Positive Effect 
If there has been an effect, could you describe this effect in more detail? 
Could you cite some examples? 
If the Western oil industry wants to be more helpful in your struggle for 
democratic development and human rights, do you have any suggestions 
for what it could do?  
 
3 How do you think the Western oil industry affects the serious corruption 
problem in Iran? 
 Has it had  No effect Negative effect  Positive effect 
If there has been an effect, could you describe this effect in more detail? 
Could you cite some examples? 
If the Western oil industry wants to be more helpful in reducing the level 
of corruption, do you have any suggestions for what it could do? 
Part III: Questions about Iranian identity 
How would you rank these ‘competing’ labels to describe your own identity? 
That is, in what order would you apply these labels to yourself? 
Iranian citizen …………… 
Persian, Kurd, Talish, Guilani, Mazandarani, Bakhtiar, Lor, Baluchi, Azeri, 
Turkmen, Arab …………… 
Muslim …………… 
Part IV: Recent developments 
• Political Islam in Iran 
• Destabilisation of Iran  
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• Terrorism and the Western oil industry in Iran 
 
NB: In Part IV of the interview schedule we only present themes for discus-
sion, with no standardised questions. 
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Abstract 
The hybrid of democratic and theocratic institutions of revolutionary Iran is 
now over twenty years old, and is undergoing challenge. An elected presi-
dent with popular legitimacy but no control of the means of coercion is ende-
avouring to open up and liberalise, but is being opposed by the conservatives 
with theocratic vetoes, newspaper closures and street violence.  
Part One of this report looks at the diarchy of President Khatami and 
Supreme Leader Khamenei, their legitimacies, their ‘minimalist’ strategies, 
and their common interest in restraining their wilder supporters from pro-
voking chaos or civil war.  
The report then considers the elements of ‘civil society’ resulting from 
deep structural change in Iran: demography and education, the role of 
women and the free press. Finally, this part considers the journalistic com-
parison of Khatami with Gorbachev, and finds that although both are/were 
attempting limited reform of a faltering system of which they were them-
selves a part, no Iranian Yeltsin has yet emerged.  
Part Two of the report is the results of in-depth interviews with 14 promi-
nent reformers. They are optimistic about the prospects for long-term 
change; all the conservatives can do is postpone change or perpetrate a 
bloodbath, they cannot put the clock back.  
Our sample tended to consider the oil companies a bad influence. How-
ever, they made a sharp distinction between American companies, which 
they thought more ethical and transparent, and the secretive European, Arab 
and Japanese companies.  
Asked what the oil companies should do to promote democratic deve-
lopement, the interviewees emphasised transparency above all.  
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